This article provides an agonistic interpretation of Robert Brandom's social-pragmatic account of normativity. I argue that social practice, on this approach, should be seen not just as cooperative, but also as contestatory. This aspect, which has so far remained implicit, helps to illuminate Brandom's claim that normative statuses are 'instituted' by social practices: normative statuses are brought into play in mutual engagement, and are only in play from an engaged social perspective among others. Moreover, in contrast to a positivist or conventionalist understanding of Brandom's work, it shows that the possibility of a critical stance toward existing practices is not only compatible with, but already implicit in this form of pragmatism. This can be made explicit with the notion of farcical practices: practices that are treated merely as if they institute genuine commitments and entitlements. Interpreting a practice as farcical is taking a critical stance toward it, and this possibility is inherent in Brandom's theoretical framework. This opens the way for a fruitful appropriation of Brandom's pragmatism for social and political philosophy.
Introduction
Pragmatist approaches to normativity affirm a kind of primacy of practice: they seek to account for the bindingness of norms in terms of social practices. Part of the appeal of such approaches is that they are (or purport to be) light on metaphysical and epistemic presuppositions, avoiding dualisms such as those between mind and world or subject and object. For instance, at the level of the theory of meaning, pragmatist approaches try to explain the correctness of applications of concepts (what words really mean) in first instance in terms of their use (how they are treated by those who deploy them), rather than in terms of their relation of reference to the world. 1 This burdens pragmatists with the task of providing a practice-based explanation of how participants might individually and collectively be wrong about the meaning and application of concepts, or of how we can do without the idea that they could. At the socio-political level, pragmatist approaches to normativity face a parallel challenge: it seems that the primacy of practice renders them incapable of providing a standpoint for criticism, apparently committing theorists to a kind of social positivism or conventionalism that is forced to accept existing practices as authoritative.
My aim in this paper is to examine a particular kind of pragmatism, developed by Robert Brandom, and to show that it has resources for addressing this concern at the socio-political level that have so far not been acknowledged. The central aim of Brandom's Making It Explicit is to provide an explication of the normativity of meaning in terms of social practice, including a social-pragmatic account of conceptual reference and objectivity which makes intelligible that a linguistic community can be held to be mistaken about the proper meaning and application of concepts. The debate on Brandom's social pragmatism has focused on this theory of meaning and its implications for philosophy of mind and action; its uptake in social and political philosophy has so far been very limited. 2 Yet, as I aim to show, Brandom's theoretical framework also provides fertile soil for a social-pragmatic approach to social and political philosophy that is neither necessarily positivist nor conservative. To see this, we 3 need to delve into his controversial account of conceptual normativity and bring out its essentially contestatory character-which has not been sufficiently appreciated by either Brandom or his critics. Doing so should clear a hurdle for the fruitful appropriation of this agonistic social pragmatism for social and political philosophy.
Brandom has developed a sophisticated and systematic theory of meaning in terms of use, which I introduce in more detail in section two. He argues that concepts have their point and purpose in social practices that are implicitly normative. In Brandom's vocabulary, participants in social practices are interpreted as engaged in 'deontic scorekeeping', where each keeps multiple sets of books that track the commitments and entitlements of others and themselves. Commitment and entitlement are the basic normative statuses that participants attribute to one another; they are what one might call the currency of social practice. From each participant's perspective, the significance of a commitment is assessed against a repertoire of further commitments. Such repertoires of background commitments are embodied in social practices in the widest sense, in habits, institutions, ways of speaking, etc.
Much of individuals' mutually holding each other to account is a matter of implicitly treating one another as committed to do and to believe various things in social practices. While these normative statuses can often be made explicit and disputed in a game of giving and asking for reasons, Brandom holds that they cannot be explained with reference to explicit rules or principles, but should be understood in first instance as implicit in the actions and attitudes of participants. For him, the pragmatist idea of the primacy of practice takes the form of the claim that normative statuses are 'instituted' by social practices, or more precisely, by the scorekeeping activity or practical attitudes of individuals; what it is for something to be appropriate is understood in terms of what it is for something to be taken to be appropriate.
Yet, as many commentators have pointed out, it is difficult to see the exact sense in which, according to Brandom's theoretical framework, normative statuses are instituted by social practices (or the attitudes of participants engaged in them). 3 While he repeatedly states that normative statuses are to be explained in terms of practical attitudes, Brandom holds at the same time that social practice is irreducibly normative: normative statuses are invoked again to explain the notion of practical attitudes, and so his approach appears circular at best. In section three, I present a reading of Brandom's account of normativity that tries to make sense of the complex relation between normative statuses and practical attitudes by emphasizing the contestatory character of social practice. Social practice, as an ongoing open-ended process of action and response, should be understood not just as a form of cooperation, in the sense that individuals are engaged in a common activity, but also as a form of contestation, where social perspectives inevitably conflict. My interpretive claim is that due to its perspectival, dynamic, and open-ended character, Brandom's view of social practice can fruitfully be understood as an 'agon'; a continuous contest-not a struggle for annihilation-in which the standards of excellence are themselves also object of contestation. This does not mean that social practice is irrational or a mere play of power-relations. It does mean it involves contestation all the way down. 4 There is no sovereign perspective according to which truth and appearance can be distinguished, or criteria formulated for distinguishing them-there are only the situated social perspectives of actual participants, which always to some extent differ and conflictand it is precisely this difference that keeps the practice going. Seen through the lens of the agon, the socio-perspectival distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes expresses a tension between merely acknowledged and actually undertaken commitments that is inherent in social engagement. This suggests that talk of 'institution' of normative statuses by normative attitudes is slightly misleading; rather, normative statuses are brought into play in mutual engagement, and are only in play from an engaged social perspective.
This contestatory character of conceptual normativity is also the key to addressing the charge of positivism or conventionalism at the socio-political level. The absence of a privileged or sovereign standpoint does not imply the absence of a standpoint of critique.
Against a positivist reading of Brandom, put forward by Robert Pippin, and against the grain 5 of some of Brandom's own formulations, I argue in section four that the possibility of a critical stance toward social practices is not only compatible with but already implicit in his agonistic form of social pragmatism. I make this explicit with the notion of farcical practices:
practices that are treated merely as if they institute genuine commitments and entitlements, although-according to some interpretation of the practice within a wider constellation of social practices-those commitments and entitlements are disingenuous or illegitimate.
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Interpreting a practice as farcical is taking a critical stance toward it, and the possibility of articulating this is inherent in Brandom's theoretical framework.
The pragmatic turn
Brandom presents the vast theoretical edifice of Making It Explicit as an expression or articulation of what people do when they talk and think-its aim is to 'mak[e] explicit the implicit structure characteristic of discursive practice as such' (Brandom 1994: 649) . This expressive project enables us to see how meaning and intentionality can be explained in terms of the roles that concepts, propositions, beliefs and actions play in social practices. The meaning of an expression cannot be explained independently of an account of its use; conceptual content is conferred upon linguistic expressions and actions by discursive practices. Brandom aims to show how this works by providing a theory of meaning (semantics) rooted in a theory of use (pragmatics). In his view, one can make meaning and intentionality intelligible by showing how they are bound up in practices; one cannot make those practices intelligible by reference to a prior notion of conceptual content-a commitment nicely summed up in the maxim: 'semantics must answer to pragmatics' (Brandom, 1994: 83, 145) . This situates Brandom in a broad pragmatist tradition that views meaning in terms of use (of which the later Wittgenstein is probably the most famous 6 exponent)-but the extent to which Brandom systematically theoretically elaborates this idea is unprecedented.
Brandom sees this approach as reversing the order of explanation adopted by a more established approach based on the notion of representation (Brandom 2001: 4) . 6 On that approach, for linguistic expressions to have meaning is for them to represent something about the world. In virtue of that relation to the world, conceptual content can be believed and expressed by individuals. The relation of representation thus provides the basis for explaining the functions that beliefs and assertions can perform for agents who encounter one another in a shared world. Brandom does not deny that expressions can represent something about the world; what he denies is that this relation is a good starting point for an explanation of meaning and intentionality. More specifically, it does not provide resources to analyze the dualistic relations between mind and world or subject and object it postulates. 7 Brandom claims that if one starts instead with the role conceptual contents play in social practice, their representational aspect can be made intelligible as implicit in social practice. Meaning is conferred upon beliefs and assertions by our ways of using them, rather than by a relation to the world that can be antecedently specified. So meaning is in first instance expressive rather than representational (Brandom 2001: 7-10) . To assert something is to do something, to participate in a 'game of giving and asking for reasons' (Brandom 1994: 167) . To show how this sense of expression can explain a notion of representation-that beliefs or assertions can be about the world-is one of the main tasks he sets for himself.
As I mentioned, the idea of a primacy of practice is not new, but Brandom develops it in systematic and innovative ways. What marks his distinct flavor of pragmatism is to begin with his way of explaining the content of concepts in terms of their role in reasoning-his pragmatism is a form of rationalism. It is also a social pragmatism, because he sees reasoning as a social activity, a game of giving and asking for reasons. (Brandom 1994: 180-191 (Brandom 1994: 488, 590) . This allows Brandom to distinguish between the different attitudes of attributing, undertaking, and acknowledging a commitment. Attributing a commitment is the practical attitude of taking someone to be committed to something. Acknowledging a commitment is attributing it to oneself, taking oneself to be committed. And for someone to undertake a commitment is to do something that entitles others to attribute the commitment to that person (Brandom 1994: 162) . This means that one can undertake a commitment (according to someone else) without acknowledging it.
The game of giving and asking for reasons is the practice whereby participants negotiate these differences of perspective, mutually evaluating what each says and does against a background of further commitments. From a listener's perspective, whether a speaker is entitled to a claim is assessed in light of its compatibility with other commitments the listener takes the speaker to be committed to. At the same time, the listener assesses what the speaker says in light of her own commitments to determine whether it is something to which she is willing to acknowledge commitment herself.
Deontic scorekeeping is a dynamic activity in the sense that participants not only keep track of one another's scores (in normal language: beliefs and their truth, intentions and their propriety), they also engage one another with words and deeds, trying to alter the score.
Attributions of commitments and entitlements are continually adjusted in light of what participants say and do, and this is what gives words and deeds their significance. In
Brandom's vocabulary, performances have 'pragmatic significance' insofar as they alter the patterns of commitments and entitlements participants undertake and attribute: 'The significance of a performance is the difference it makes in the deontic score-that is, the way in which it changes what commitments and entitlements the practitioners, including the performer, attribute to each other and acquire, acknowledge, or undertake themselves' (Brandom 1994: 166) . So discursive practice is a dynamic process of ongoing mutual engagement.
Consider the speech act of making a claim or assertion, which is central to Brandom's notion of discursive practice. He asks: 'What is it we are doing when we assert, claim, or declare something?' (Brandom 1994: 167) Part of the answer is that we undertake a certain kind of commitment, a 'doxastic commitment' or belief. In making a claim, a speaker The answer is what Brandom calls 'semantic inferentialism' (Brandom 1994: 67-140; Brandom 2001 ). 12 On this view, the content of an expression consists in its relations to other expressions. Meaning is relational, and the relation that gives content to an expression is not one of reference between an expression and something in the world, but of inference between an expression and other expressions. They stand in such relations in the first place in virtue of being used in practices of reasoning, by counting in practice as premises and conclusions for other expressions. To take an assertion to mean something is to treat it a certain way: to take certain propositions to follow from it and others to count as reasons for or against it. Grasping a concept is mastering its inferential circumstances and consequences of application, that is, being able to tell what else a speaker commits herself to by invoking a particular concept in a particular situation. Semantic inferentialism implies a holistic view of meaning, because concepts have their content only with respect to other concepts; one can only have one concept if one has many. Consequently, committing oneself to one thing is committing oneself to a lot of other things as well. This inferential articulation of commitments has an important consequence, when it is combined with the idea that participants have the practical ability to distinguish between their own and others' commitments: the commitments one has undertaken outstrip those one acknowledges. As Brandom states: 'The crucial inferential articulation of discursive commitments consists in part in the fact that unacknowledged commitments can be (taken by other scorekeepers to be) undertaken consequentially, by acknowledging commitments to claims that (according to those scorekeepers) entail them' (Brandom 1994: 627) .
Semantic inferentialism should not be mistaken for a formalistic or disembodied account of meaning. 13 The inferential relations between concepts are constituted in actual, day-to-day social practices. Brandom provides accounts of the role of perception and action in these practices, which connect concepts to the world and objects in it. In virtue of these practices, the basic sense of compatibility between conceptual contents is one of material rather than formal compatibility. For material inferences, the contents of the premises and conclusion, rather than the logical form of the inference, determine whether the inference is a good one.
Examples Brandom gives are the inference from 'today is Wednesday' to 'tomorrow will be Thursday' and from 'lightning is seen now' to 'thunder will be heard soon'. 'Endorsing these inferences is part of grasping or mastering those concepts, quite apart from any specifically logical competence' (Brandom 1994: 98) . Brandom gives priority to material over formal inferences, arguing that the latter can be explained in terms of the former (Brandom 1994: 97-107; cf. Sellars, 1953) .
A final feature of Brandom's pragmatism that is important to mention is that it is interpretive all the way down. To take someone's assertion as meaningful is to take a stance toward her, treating her as a participant on whom score can be kept, and holding her responsible for living up to her commitments and answerable to challenges to her entitlement to those commitments. Similarly, in taking participants in social practice to be deontic scorekeepers, an interpreter adopts a scorekeeping perspective toward them. 'In adopting such a stance, the interpreter takes the interlocutors being interpreted to be committed to keeping score according to specific patterns' (Brandom 1994: 638) . Participants are engaged in social practices; objects are merely involved in them. To take a pile of bricks to be inanimate objects merely involved but not engaged in a practice (say, bricklaying), is to take a different kind of stance toward them: to take it that certain things can be true or false of them (for instance, that they are brown and suitable for constructing a wall), but that they cannot be committed or entitled to anything. This is not to say that bricks cannot be taken to be engaged in practices (we can imagine some form of ritualistic practice, for instance, in which participants attribute beliefs or intentions to bricks), but that whether they are or not is in some sense a normative matter, which depends on whether or not it is appropriate, according to an interpretation of the relevant practice, to treat them as participants (cf. Brandom 1979 (Brandom 1994: 647) In short, Brandom interprets social practice as a matter of participants' mutually holding one another to account, from each participant's socially situated perspective, in ongoing dynamic engagement. In discursive practice, this implicit deontic scorekeeping is made explicit by giving and asking for reasons.
Normativity and the agonal character of discursive practice
The deontic scorekeeping model just described invokes normative statuses (basically, commitment and entitlement) and practical attitudes (taking someone to be committed or (Brandom 1994: 497) . So it is important to distinguish clearly between the attribution of normative statuses, which is the adoption of practical attitudes, and the institution of normative statuses, which is somehow a product of the adoption of practical attitudes, but not reducible to it. The difficulty is in understanding how exactly this notion that social practices 'institute' normative statuses is to be cashed out without collapsing normative statuses into practical attitudes.
A useful place to begin to explain this is to ask the question whose attitudes are supposed to institute normative statuses. Initially two options seem available, but both turn out to be problematic (Brandom 1994: 52-55) . On the one hand, one can construe normative statuses as instituted by the attitudes of individuals. But this collapses a normative status into a practical attitude-something's being correct into its being taken to be correct-since there would be no sense in which an individual's assessment of commitments and entitlements could be mistaken. This is the pitfall of subjectivism. On the other hand, the distinction between a (instituted) normative status and an (attributed) individual assessment of it could be preserved by treating the attitudes of a community as a whole as authoritative. Someone's takingsomething-to-be-correct could be held answerable to something's being-correct-according-tothe-community. But this makes the possibility that a whole community could be wrong unintelligible and invokes a reified conception of community. This is the pitfall of communal assessment (Brandom 1994: 37-41 ).
Brandom's provocative idea is that it is precisely the perspectival character of social practice that makes sense of the relation between normative statuses and practical attitudes.
Normative statuses (such as commitments and entitlements) are 'instituted by constellations of socially perspectival normative attitudes of attributing and undertaking such commitments' (Brandom 1994: 62) . The crux is to focus not on the relation between the individual and the community, but on the differences of social perspective between participants engaged in discursive practice. How does this work? As we've seen, participants attribute meaning to expressions against the background of their own wider commitments-something means to them what they take it to mean-and as a consequence the same assertion can mean slightly (and sometimes widely) different things to different people:
The semantic contents of discursive commitments, attitudes toward those commitments, and the linguistic performances that express those attitudes can in principle only be specified from the perspective provided by some repertoire of background commitments and attitudes; how it is correct to specify any particular content varies from one such repertoire to another. (Brandom 1994: 497, cf. 586-592) Recall that the content of an expression is to be understood in terms of its inferential relations to other expressions, what it counts as a premise or a conclusion for. Given that individuals have different repertoires of commitments, these inferential relations are different for every scorekeeper. In order to take assertions to be meaningful and (potentially) true or correct at all, participants must be able to distinguish in practice between the significance an expression has from their own point of view and from that of others-between the consequences others take an expression to have, and those one endorses. The expression, 'According to A Theory of Justice, justice is the first virtue of social institutions', licenses various inferences depending on the further commitments of whoever endorses it. For instance, only to someone who knows that John Rawls was the author of the book A Theory of Justice, does it imply that 'John Rawls thought that justice is the first virtue of social institutions'. According to Brandom, the ability to communicate is a matter of mastering the navigation of these differences of perspective-the capacity to assess what an assertion implies with respect to different repertoires of commitments and entitlements. 'Carrying on a conversation involves being able to move from perspective to perspective, appreciating the significance a remark would have for various interlocutors' (Brandom 1994: 635) .
Brandom provides detailed analyses of the language that facilitates the expression and navigation of these differences of social perspective. For instance, he explains in deontic scorekeeping terms how singular terms purport to refer to objects (Brandom 1994: 334-403) , and how different linguistic expressions can have the same semantic content (for instance how anaphora pick up the content of an expression while substituting a different expression, so that, say, 'he' can in certain circumstances be substituted for 'John Rawls') (Brandom 1994: 404-489) . Implicit in these ways of speaking, he claims, is the representational dimension of meaning. By using representational expressions-speaking of or about certain thingsparticipants purport to talk about and dispute the same things, while understanding them differently. What is important for Brandom is that this representational dimension, while already implicit in discursive practice from the start, can be elucidated in inferential and pragmatic terms without appealing to a prior representational relation to the world. This is how Brandom makes good on his commitment of explaining representation in terms of discursive practice, rather than the other way around.
The details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper, but it is helpful to briefly discuss the distinction between de re and de dicto ascriptions of meaning, which is central to It is the different perspectives provided by different sets of commitments that make it possible to triangulate on objective states of affairs. Our practices of comparing, assessing, and correcting different repertoires of commitments one with respect to another-those we attribute to others and those we undertake ourselves-are what make them intelligible as perspectives, views of something, ways in which a perspective-independent reality can appear. (Brandom 1995: 907) Mutually holding one another to account in this way also involves holding oneself responsible, because such engagement also gives rise to the need for self-interpretation and hence self-criticism. Distinguishing the commitments and entitlements of others from one's own involves taking others to be correct or mistaken in light of the commitments one is willing to undertake oneself, that is, in light of what the world is really like or what people have actually done, according to the scorekeeper. But assessing others' commitments in practice involves also giving one's own commitments up for assessment, acknowledging the possibility that one might need to revise them. Undertaking a commitment involves a responsibility to provide reasons for it when challenged, and revising one's repertoire of commitments if better reasons are put forward. Each participant, therefore, not only distinguishes between commitments attributed to others and those undertaken by himself, but also between the commitments he acknowledges and whichever commitments it would be appropriate to undertake. This distinction arises in virtue of the fact that scorekeeping is an engagement between a multiplicity of perspectives.
This social-perspectival structure of discursive practice makes it possible to explicate the distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes without collapsing one into the other. The notion of a normative status expresses the difference from a scorekeeping perspective between commitments one attributes to others and those one is willing to acknowledge, or, with respect to one's own commitments, between those with which one happens to find oneself and those one should endorse. This possibility of being mistaken-in particular cases, as there is of course no point of view from which one can assess one's repertoire of commitments as a whole-is an inherent or structural feature of scorekeeping.
This is what the notion of the 'institution of normative statuses' makes explicit: 'This
perspectival structure is what has been implicitly appealed to throughout by talk of the institution of deontic statuses by deontic attitudes' (Brandom 1994: 597) .
Speaking of the 'institution' of normative statuses may invite an interpretation according to which there is some sovereign perspective-the definitively instituted scorecard, specifying the way the world really is independently of a socially situated perspective-with which one might compare the scores actually being kept by participants. And this impression might be reinforced by Brandom's insistence that this social-perspectival account of meaning makes available a notion of objectivity, which consists in the possibility that not only each individual, but everyone can be mistaken about the truth of an assertion or the application of a concept. 16 But it would be a mistake to understand Brandom that way. Normative statuses are instituted by scorekeeping activity just in the sense that distinguishing between normative statuses and practical attitudes is something done from each perspective. In fact, Brandom's account of discursive practice is radically anti-sovereign-there is no correctness aside from a perpetual struggle to determine, always provisionally, what counts as correct:
[E]ach perspective is at most locally privileged in that it incorporates a structural distinction between objectively correct applications of concepts and applications that are merely subjectively taken to be correct. But none of these perspectives is privileged in advance over any other. […] What is shared by all discursive perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way of concept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is-the structure, not the content. (Brandom 1994: 600) So the scorekeeping account of discursive practices does not provide resources for designating particular assertions as objectively true or determining what concepts really mean.
The notion of objectivity appears deflated; it turns out that, after all, 'there is never any final answer to what is correct' (Brandom 1994: 647 Seen through the lens of the agon, the socio-perspectival distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes expresses a tension that is inherent in play. As a dynamic and ongoing engagement, discursive practice is characterized by a constitutive tension between acknowledged and actually undertaken commitments. What participants are really committed to is always to be determined in practice and therefore always in some sense underdetermined.
Discursive practice (reasoning) is not out to dissolve this tension; as a practice it relies on it.
Plurality and disagreement are not defects, but the source of the productivity of agonal engagement or discursive practice. On the one hand, it is productive in the sense of opening up a common world; for Brandom, there is no common world except through plural perspectives on it. 18 Only as engaged in activity with others does the possibility of being mistaken oneself become intelligible, because only then does one's perspective appear as a perspective. On the other hand, it is productive in the sense that discursive scorekeepers or agonal contestants develop new ways of speaking and acting and are transformed through their engagement. To engage discursively is also to open oneself up to criticism, and thereby to self-transformation (cf. Owen 1995: 142-144, 160 ). This implicit commitment to selfovercoming is reflected in Brandom's view that the task of philosophy is to The example of a dance nicely captures the dynamic, performative aspects of discursive practice, where participants share their being engaged in an activity, but not their actions or even their understanding of that activity. But if we push this example a little further, taking a slightly broader view of the practice, where others are involved as well, as performers or as audience, we cannot avoid elements of contestation. What marks a dance as a dance are certain norms or standards of excellence. The joy of dancing lies in part in a striving for excellence, and potentially in outshining others. But excellence in dancing isn't just conforming to antecedently specified norms, making exactly the right steps at the right time.
Excellent dancers can change the dance in process, make it their own, invent new moves and even new styles of dancing. What counts as a dance-move displaying a particular excellence and what as a misstep isn't fully specifiable in advance but depends also on its uptake in subsequent activity. 20 This agonal character is an essential but underappreciated feature of Brandom's understanding of discursive practice. I think it is essential, because his account of normative constraint in terms of the distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes cannot be properly understood without it. Precisely this agonal aspect of his thought enables
Brandom to avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism and communal assessment. Instead of collapsing the distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes at the individual or communal level, the distinction should be seen as a tension inherent in mutual engagement and contestation. It is underappreciated also because it shows that Brandom's social pragmatism is not committed to a kind of social positivism. To this I now turn.
Farcical practices
Having emphasized the agonal or contestatory character of Brandom's account of meaning in terms of use, it is now possible to address the issue of its alleged social positivism or conventionalism: the idea that this approach resigns theorists (as interpreters) to describing practices, forcing us to accept as normatively binding the practices and institutions with which we find ourselves (or which we ascribe to a community), denying the possibility of social criticism (see, for instance, Pippin 2005: 395-396; Pinkard 2007: 164-166) . Although a few of Brandom's explicit statements give some ground for attributing a social positivism to him, the agonal aspect of his social pragmatism shows that he cannot really be committed to this and that the possibility of a critical stance is built in from the start.
The prima facie appeal of this charge lies in the suggestion that if normative statuses come into play only through social practices, those normative statuses cannot provide critical purchase on those same social practices. An obvious response, to which I take Brandom to be in fact committed, is to say that social practices do not take place in a vacuum, but rather come in constellations of interconnected practices; that these practices and their interconnections are all subject to interpretation and hence contestable; and that even though they cannot all be criticized at the same time (if only because criticizing is itself a practice), in practice there is always some standpoint from within from which another point can be subjected to criticism.
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Yet it is worth examining the textual basis for attributing a social conventionalism to Brandom a bit more closely. He does make some apolitical gestures that seem to deny the possibility of social criticism. Brandom says, for instance, that there are certain norms about which a community as a whole cannot be mistaken. The idea is that some norms are just conventions, such that whatever a community takes to be the norm, is the norm. Examples
Brandom gives include what the Kwakiutl (a Native American tribe) take to be appropriate greeting gestures, and 'who is really married' in a particular community: 'it makes no sense to suppose that they could collectively be wrong about this sort of thing' (Brandom 1994: 53-54 (Brandom 1994: 37) . Intersubjectivity should be understood in terms of the relations between individuals, not in terms of the relation between individual and community; Brandom calls this an 'I-thou' rather than 'I-we' construal of intersubjectivity (Brandom 1994: 39) . In light of this fundamental criticism, it seems strange that Brandom grants that for certain norms the communal assessment analysis is correct: the 'community's all-inclusive practical assessment cannot be mistaken' (Brandom 1994: 54 (Brandom 1994: 38) . But that would render the idea that the community cannot be held to account on certain matters more plausible only if the propriety of such procedures were uncontestable.
The idea that there are certain norms about which a community cannot be mistaken derives its appeal from the notion that some things are simply a matter of convention, whereas other norms are such that even if everyone were to agree, they could still be mistaken. If everyone 26 takes it that raising one's right hand is an appropriate greeting gesture in certain circumstances, it just is, whereas everyone may take it that the earth is flat, even if in fact it is not. The sign is arbitrary in a sense in which a belief is not; for this the community is not answerable to anything, whereas beliefs about the world are answerable to the world. But it does not follow that conventions are therefore uncontestable, and a community is incorrigible about them. The key is to see that whether something is arbitrary, and therefore fully settled by mere convention, or objective, settled by the way the world is, is a normative question. It depends on a background of further commitments. Whether or not the earth is flat is not arbitrary in this sense due to a commitment to getting things right about the world (implicit, as
Brandom argues, in discursive practice). Whether it is appropriate to raise one's right or one's left hand as a greeting is arbitrary only if we take it that the community is not already committed on the matter in virtue of some other consideration. To take something to be a matter about which the community cannot be mistaken, is to take it that there are no incompatible commitments on the matter, and hence to attribute an entitlement to the community to settle it in some way or other. So while the idea that a community is incorrigible on a certain matter may appear to collapse the tension between normative status and practical attitudes-and this is what fuels the charge of positivism-in fact it merely shifts this tension to the question whether the matter is arbitrary, or whether some other commitment is in place. This opens up any social convention to the potential critique that the matter at stake is not arbitrary, but harbors unacknowledged biases, reinforces certain relations of power, etc. In other words, the constitutive tension between actually undertaken and merely acknowledged commitments is kept in play, but shifted to a different register. the significance of what they had done-the commitment they had undertaken, and so the alteration of their status-only upon awakening from the resulting stupor.) (Brandom 1994: 162) Brandom deploys this example to illustrate what it is to undertake a commitment: 'The significance of a commitment is to be understood in terms of the practical attitude of those attributing it, that is in terms of what taking or treating someone as committed consists in'. (Brandom 1994: 162) . The pragmatic significance of a performance is understood in terms of the difference it makes to attributions of commitments and entitlements:
The significance of taking the queen's shilling lies in its being an undertaking of a commitment on the part of the recipient, altering the attributions of commitment by those who appreciate the significance of the performance. It entitles other authorities-those who according to the antecedent score already had undertaken various commitments or duties and entitlements or sorts of authority, those who therefore play a certain role or hold a certain office in the system of practices in question-to punish the performer in particular ways under particular circumstances. The normative significances of performances and the 28 deontic states of performers are instituted by the practice that consists in keeping score by adopting attitudes of attributing and acknowledging them. (Brandom 1994: 166) One thing that is important about this passage is that it shows the sense in which what commitments one has undertaken is not simply up to oneself: unwittingly, one can take on a commitment and be held accountable to it, even though one has been duped into it. This makes it a provocative and perhaps counterintuitive example. Picking up on this, Robert In light of these features, the question whether some community is engaged in a practice, and what the norms are that are implicit in it, is itself a matter of interpretation; it is something that can be said only from a perspective (or rather: taking participants to be engaged in practice is having a perspective on them, keeping score); hence it is normative, something one can be held responsible for. There is no perspective-independent way practices are. This casts the example in a different light: the possibility of criticism is built in from the start. What a drunkard really commits himself to by taking the queen's shilling-what inferences this performance licenses-is assessed differently from different perspectives.
Brandom suggests that, 'according to the practice', he commits himself to enlist. But we can draw up an alternative interpretation of the practice. For example, the situation may be such that none of the immediate participants-neither the poor drunk lad who is being set up, nor the recruitment officers-take unwittingly accepting the queen's shilling to be sufficient to enlist, even if they all keep up the pretense. (Of course, to interpret the situation this way, we'd have to be entitled to interpret them in this way in light of something they do, but imagine they secretly admit this to us.) They may all take it that punishment is likely to follow if he does not show up, but that leaves open the question whether the officials are entitled to punish, and whether he really is committed. The answer depends on an interpretation of the practice, in light of the 'antecedent score', as Brandom mentions, but this antecedent score is assessed differently from different perspectives, and presumably depends on a wide range of practices.
In real life, in contrast to Brandom's admittedly simplified and artificial example, what someone commits himself to by some behavior is always a matter of perspectival assessment.
And in real life, there is never just one reading of a practice, and we do not find practices in a vacuum, but rather in 'systems of interdefined practices' (Brandom 1994: 163) . What this shows is that it is possible to take a practice to be farcical. By a 'farcical practice' I mean a practice that is treated (to some extent) as if it institutes genuine commitments and entitlements, and this is reflected in participants' overt behavior, although according to some scorekeeper (who takes it to be farcical), the participants are not really committed to what the practice takes them to be committed to. This notion of farcical practices is consistent with and even necessary in Brandom's account. Notice that this is already implicit in the way Brandom formulates the example. He points to a discrepancy between the 'official rationale' of the queen's shilling as a substitute for contracts among illiterates, and its 'actual function [...] to enable "recruiting" by disguised officers': in the way Brandom presents the example, he is already placing it in a certain light, and implicitly already questioning it (note the scare quotes around 'recruiting'). It is possible to articulate this notion of farcical practices from just the basic framework of Brandom's theory. The ever-present possibility of practices counting as farcical is one way of expressing the tension, brought into play in social engagement, between merely acknowledged and actually undertaken commitments.
Conclusion
The expressive theoretical artifice of Making It Explicit is tailored to provide an explanation of the normativity of meaning in terms of social practice; how it is that certain expressions are appropriately applicable in a particular case and others not (but not which ones). This theoretical framework of a semantics that answers to pragmatics, of meaning in terms of use, constitutes a powerful theory of discursive practice, which offers a clear alternative to a representational account of meaning. I've argued that social practice, on this social-pragmatic approach, should be seen not just as cooperative, but also as contestatory. The distinction between normative statuses and practical attitudes articulates a socio-perspectival distinction between actually undertaken commitments and merely acknowledged ones, which is brought into play through the activity of social participants mutually holding one another to account and contesting each other's words and deeds. This tension is inherent in social engagement, which, as mutual engagement, constitutively involves discrepancies between accounts kept from different perspectives. Of course, this discussion does not do justice to all the intricacies and problems of Brandom's approach, but my aim has been to display the viability and promise of a systematic agonistic social pragmatism that can be appropriated for social and political philosophy, rather than to defend it against representationalist objections. Recent work has already provided social-pragmatic analyses of agency, power, domination, autonomy, and personhood (Anderson 2008; Erman 2010; Lance and White 2007; Rouse 2005) . Elsewhere, I draw on Brandom to illuminate the notions of political legitimacy and obligation (Fossen 2011; Fossen forthcoming) . In any case, such an appropriation need not be impeded by worries about undue conventionalism, since a notion of farcical practices, and thereby the possibility of a critical stance, is available within the basic framework of this theoretical approach.
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